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JOHN GARVEY
ANOTHER WAY OF LOOKING
AT SCHOOL AID
In the 1983 and 1984 Terms the Supreme Court decided several
controversial cases about government aid to schools. In 1984 it held
in Grove City College v. Bell' that scholarship aid to college students
counted as assistance to the school for purposes of Title IX2 but
that only the school's financial aid program had to comply with that
law. Last Term the Court held that remedial and other aid for
parochial school students counted as assistance to their schools and
that the aid programs were altogether invalid under the Establish-
ment Clause. Though both events caused quite a stir,3 no one
seems to have noticed that the problems were virtually identical.
The solutions were not, though I think they should have been.
Grove City involved a small private school that refused as a matter
of principle to accept federal or state aid. It did, however, admit
students who paid their tuition with congressionally authorized
Pell grants.4 The Court held that that money was indirect aid to the
school and that the school was therefore required to abide by the
John H. Garvey is Visiting Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School.
AUTHOR'S NOTE: I would like to thank Alex Aleinikoff, Paul Bator, and Fred Schauer for
reading an earlier version of this paper. While on leave in the Office of the Solicitor General,
I participated in briefs in Grave City and in Mueller v. Allen; the views expressed here are my
own.
104 S.Ct. 1211 (1984).
2 Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. (1982).
Congress is considering several bills designed to overturn Grave City. H.R. 700, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); S. 272, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); S. 431, 99th Cong., Ist Sess.
(1985).
4 20 U.S.C. § 1070(a) (1982).
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prohibition against sex discrimination in Title IX. But Title IX
only applies to the "education program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance," 5 not to the recipient institution as a whole.
The Court found that in the case of Pell grants the only program
covered by the antidiscrimination principle was the school's
financial aid program.
Last Term's cases were Grand Rapids School District v. Ball6 and
Aguilar v. Felton.7 In Grand Rapids the school district offered two
programs in the parochial schools. One (Shared Time) provided
remedial and "enrichment" math and reading, art, music, and
physical education. These were taught during regular class periods
by full-time public school employees, in rooms "leased" (at $6.00
per room per week) from the parochial schools, with materials
supplied by the public school system. The other (Community Edu-
cation) offered such courses as arts and crafts and chess in voluntary
classes at the end of the school day. These were taught in large part
by instructors already teaching at the schools where the courses
were offered. No attempt was made to monitor either program for
religious content.8
The Court held both programs unconstitutional under the Lemon
antiestablishment test9 because they had the effect of advancing
religion. This effect, the Court said, might occur in three ways.
First, the teachers might "become involved in intentionally or inad-
vertently inculcating particular religious tenets or beliefs."'" There
was no evidence that this had happened, but the Court found evi-
dence unnecessary since the classes weren't monitored and no one
had any incentive to report violations. Second, the programs might
subsidize the schools' religious function by providing "direct aid to
[their] educational function."" Third, "the programs may provide a
crucial symbolic link between government and religion[.]7' 12
s 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1982).
6 105 S.Ct. 3216 (1985).
7 105 S.Ct. 3232 (1985).
8 105 S.Ct. at 3218-20.
9 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
'0 105 S.Ct. at 3223.
11 Id. at 3229.
12 Id. at 3223. The Chief Justice and Justice O'Connor each concurred in the judgment as
to the Community Education program but dissented as to the Shared Time program. Id. at
3231. Justices White (id. at 3249) and Rehnquist (id. at 323 1) would have upheld the constitu-
tionality of both programs.
FINANCIAL AID AND THE RELIGION CLAUSES
In Aguilar the Court struck down New York City's program for
using Title I money 3 to provide remedial reading and math, En-
glish as a second language, and guidance services to parochial
school students at their own schools. The offerings were staffed by
regular public school employees and monitored by field personnel
and program coordinators.
New York City's program was thus similar to the Shared Time
program in Grand Rapids, but the issue was different because New
York had monitored its classes for religious content and found no
improper effects. Catch-22. New York's monitoring violated the
entanglement part of the Lemon test. Having government agents
work with parochial school personnel on matters like schedules and
students' needs posed a danger for nonadherents of the school's
denomination. " Having them "guard against the infiltration of reli-
gious thought"'" threatened the religious liberty of those at the
school.
I. ANTIESTABLISHMENT AND ANTIDISCRIMINATION
A. THE ANTIESTABLISHMENT PRINCIPLE
I begin by pointing out the similarity in structure and function of
the antiestablishment principle applied in Grand Rapids and Aguilar
and the antidiscrimination principle applied in Grove City. The
antiestablishment principle in parochial school aid cases is really a
"state action" rule written in substantive First Amendment terms.
In the typical state action case a private institution (a school, 6 a
hospital, 7 a nursing home, 18 a restaurant19) has done something
" Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, as amended, Pub. L.
No. 96-561, 92 Stat. 2153 (1978), authorized the Secretary of Education to distribute money
to local educational agencies to meet the needs of educationally deprived children from low-
income families. (It has been superseded by Chapter I of the Education Consolidation and
Improvement Act of 1981, 20 U.S.C. § 3801 et seq. (1982), but the relevant provisions are
virtually identical.) The statute gives local educational agencies some freedom to design
programs (§ 3805(a)), but they must include services for deprived children in private schools
(§ 3806(a)).
14 105 S.Ct. at 3237.
Is d. at 3239.
16 Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
17 Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital, 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964).
's Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
,9 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
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(discriminated, interfered with speech, denied a hearing) that the
Constitution forbids government to do. The plaintiff will claim that
the institution's behavior should be considered "state action" be-
cause the government has given the institution a lot of money or
otherwise significantly involved itself in the institution's affairs.
In cases where the plaintiff is successful it doesn't really matter
whether the government intended that the institution should mis-
behave. 2o But the plaintiff does have to show that the government is
"responsible"21 in the sense that there is some causal nexus between
what it has done and the specific institutional activity complained
of.
In parochial school aid cases private institutions are engaged in
behavior (religious activity) that the Constitution forbids to govern-
ment. There is nothing wrong with such activity if it remains
private-indeed it is then protected by the Free Exercise Clause.
But Lemon v. Kurtzman says that the government may not purpose-
fully promote such activity nor take action whose principal or pri-
mary effect is to do so. Lemon also says (though this is really just
another kind of effect) that the government "must not foster 'an
excessive government entanglement with religion.'"22
B. THE ANTIDISCRIMINATION PRINCIPLE
The antidiscrimination principle in Title IX is also a "state ac-
tion" rule, though one that is broader than the Constitution alone
would require. Title IX says that23
No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any education program or ac-
tivity receiving Federal financial assistance[.J
If discrimination occurs, the granting agency must see that it is
eradicated. If it is not, the agency is authorized to cut off assistance
20 When the plaintiff accuses the government itself of discrimination, he or she usually has
to show such an improper intent. Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S.
256, 279 (1979); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-44 (1976). The Court hasn't
altogether squared this comparatively recent rule with more ancient state action principles.
See Choper, Thoughts on State Action: The "Government Function" and "Power Theory"
Approaches, 1979 Wash. U.L.Q. 757, 765-69.
21 Blum v. Yaretsky, note 18 supra, 457 U.S. at 1011.
22 403 U.S. at 612-13 (emphasis added).
23 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1982).
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"to the particular program, or part thereof, in which" discrimina-
tion is occurring.24
As the cutoff sanction shows, Title IX's objective is not to forbid
discrimination by private or other nonfederal institutions outright
but to assure that the federal government does not support it either
on puipose or in ffect. The statute deems the government responsi-
ble, regardless of its intent, for any discrimination that occurs in an
"education program or activity receiving Federal financial assis-
tance." To say that the government is deemed to support discrimi-
nation is really to say that it is thought to "cause" discriminatory
"effects" under these circumstances. Other statutes apply the same
principle to discrimination based on race (Title VI of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act),2" physical handicap (§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act),2 6
and age (the Age Discrimination Act).27
It should not be surprising that the antiestablishment and antidis-
crimination principles look so similar. Both are designed to assure
that the government does not get involved in constitutionally for-
bidden activity when it gives aid to private educational institutions.
Both began as principles of constitutional law ("state action"),
though the constitutional antidiscrimination rules have been largely
displaced by statute, beginning with the 1964 Civil Rights Act. It is
only because the statutory rules are the effective ones (and because
they are so well developed through regulations and case law) that I
am not comparing what are really companion constitutional doc-
trines.
II. CAUSES AND EFFECTS
Here I propose to consider the Court's concern with "ef-
fects" in school aid cases.28 In Title IX law the presumption that
government has caused improper effects is limited in three ways:
(1) it only applies if there is "Federal financial assistance"; (2) it only
applies to the actions of "recipients" (i.e. those who are "receiving"
24 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1982).
2 5 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) etseq. (1982).
26 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
27 42 U.S.C. § 6101 a seq. (1982).
28 For reasons I will relate below, the "purpose" prong of the Lemon and antidiscrimination
rules has been irrelevant in these cases. See pages 73-74 infra.
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assistance); and (3) in the case of any recipient, it only applies if the
discrimination occurs in the particular "program or activity" to
which federal aid is going. The development of these Title IX rules
offers a sense of organization and direction that has been missing in
First Amendment cases. Yet the very same rules are being applied,
when government "causes" religious "effects" by giving aid to edu-
cational institutions.29 The only difference concerns factor (3) (the
"program or activity" rule). In applying that rule the Court has
been much more willing to find institution-wide effects in Estab-
lishment Clause cases. The statutory rules thus provide a useful
standard for judging where parochial school aid cases have taken a
wrong turn.
A. PRELUDE
Before I take up the effects rules, it may be useful to provide a list
of things they permit (col. A) and forbid (col. B) government to
provide to parochial schools (see table 1). Then I can try to explain
how this division came about.
Though there are family resemblances within each column, there
are distressing conflicts when they are laid side-by-side. A review
of comparable problems under the antidiscrimination principle
may make the results seem at least coherent, if not correct.
B. WHAT IS "FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE"?
As the term "financial assistance" suggests, the nondiscrimina-
tion principle only applies where the government gives educational
institutions something of value for nothing. The same is true in
Establishment Clause cases. Such assistance may cause forbidden
effects in a number of ways: it may provide new opportunities for
the institution to work "harm" (discrimination or indoctrination); it
may also suggest government approval of the harmful enterprise. I
will take up later the precise ways in which these effects are
thought to be caused. They do not always occur when financial
29 Coverage is the only question that occurs in parochial school aid cases. There is no
question but that the schools are engaged in religious activity. In antidiscrimination cases, by
contrast, there are difficult questions about whether the institutional conduct that the gov-
ernment may be assisting counts as "discrimination" for statutory purposes. See, e.g.,
Guardians Assn. v. Civil Service Comm'n, N.Y.C., 463 U.S. 582 (1983); Alexander v.
Choate, 105 S.Ct. 712, 716-20 (1985).
TABLE 1
Property tax exemptions 30
Tax deductions for parents3
Scholarships (college)32
Lunches 3
Books
3 4
State-prepared tests"
Reimbursement for state-prepared tests
and record keeping
36
Diagnostic services
3 7
Bus rides to school3 s
Therapeutic services off premises
3 9
Counseling off premises; 4° remedial
instruction off premiss
4 1
Construction grants (college)42
Noncategorical grants (college)4 3
Tax credits for parents'
Tuition grants (lower schools)4s
Other materials
4 6
Teacher-prepared tests47
Bus rides on field trips48
Therapeutic services on premises4 9
Counseling on premises; 0 remedial,
accelerated, or supplemental instruction
on premises
s
Maintenance and repair grants (lower
schools)5 2
Teachers' salaries5
3
30 See Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
" Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
32 Americans United for Separation of Church and State v. Blanton, 433 F. Supp. 97
(M.D. Tenn.), aff'd, 434 U.S. 803 (1977); Smith v. Bd. of Governors of University of N.C.,
429 F. Supp. 871 (W.D.N.C.), aff'd, 434 U.S. 803 (1977). Cf. Witters v. Wash. Dept. of
Services for the Blind, 54 USLW 4135 (Jan. 27, 1986).
" See Lemon, note 9 supra, 403 U.S. at 616.
14 Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
" Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
36 Committee for Public Education v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980).
17 Wohnan, note 35 supra.
" Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
19 Wolman, note 35 supra.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971); cf. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
4- Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Bd., 426 U.S. 736 (1976).
4 Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
4s Ayquist, note 44supra; Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973).
I6 Wolman, note 35 snpra; Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (given to school).
4' Levitt v. Committee for Public Education, 413 U.S. 472 (1973).
"8 Wohnan, note 35 supra.
49 Meek, note 46 supra.
so Ibid.
" Grand Rapids, note 6 supra; Aguilar, note 7 supra; Meek, note 46 supra. Cf. Public Funds
for Public Schools of N.J. v. Marburger, 358 F. Supp. 29 (D.N.J. 1973), aff'd, 417 U.S. 961
(1974) (grants ot nonpublic schools to be used for hiring public school personnel for remedial
services).
"2 Ayquist, note 44 supra. 67
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assistance is given to an institution;54 but that is a necessary condi-
tion, if not a sufficient one.
1. Grants. The paradigm of "financial assistance" under both
principles is the outright grant or loan of money to a school." And
there is no real difference between a grant of cash and a gift of
property5 6 or, as in Grand Rapids and Aguilar, services.5 7 All are
cases where the institution gets something for nothing. All may
provide new opportunities for discrimination or indoctrination. 8
All may involve a suggestion of government approval. "Why else,"
one may ask, "would the government bestow favors on the institu-
tion?"
2. Procurement. Dealing with the "leases" of classrooms in Grand
Rapids is a trickier matter, and perhaps for that reason the Court
ignored the issue. The arrangement is like the Pennsylvania law
held invalid in Lemon, which authorized the state Superintendent of
Public Instruction "to 'purchase' specified 'secular educational ser-
vices' from nonpublic schools."59 What's going on in both cases is
an attempt to build on the intuition-made explicit in antidiscrimi-
nation cases-that government procurement contracts do not count
as "financial assistance." The reason is that the purchase 60 or
s Lemon, note 9 supra.
s A state may give cash to a religious college without violating the Establishment Clause.
See col. A at notes 42 and 43.
" Compare 34 C.F.R. § 106.2(g)(1) (1984) (Department of Education Title IX regulation)
with Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 762 (maintenance and repair grants to nonpublic elementary and
secondary schools). Whether the grant violates the antidiscrimination or antiestablishment
rule is a different question. All three coverage questions-including the "program or activ-
ity" rule-must be satisfied before one can reach that conclusion.
56 See 34 C.F.R. § 106.2(g)(2) (1984) ("A grant of Federal real or personal property ....
including surplus property"). Plaintiffs challenging federal assistance of this type will have
difficulty in Establishment Clause cases after Valley Forge College v. Americans United, 454
U.S. 464 (1982), which denied standing because the donation of surplus property was not an
exercise of the spending power. That problem will ordinarily not afflict those challenging
state aid.
s Cf. 34 C.F.R. § 106.2(g)(3) (1984).
5 As Grand Rapids and Aguilar show, it may be harder to pervert services provided in kind
to religious or discriminatory ends.
"' 403 U.S. at 609. See also the schemes for "reimbursing" schools for giving and grading
tests that the Court dealt with in Levitt and Regan, notes 36, 47 supra. The Court in Lemon
never actually decided whether this form of aid had the effect of promoting religion. Instead,
it said that the effort to find out would entail impermissible entanglement. 403 U.S. at 611-
25.
o Randolph v. Alabama Inst. for Deaf and Blind, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1718
(N.D. Ala. 1982) (§ 504).
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rental6 of services or goods at fair market value for the govern-
ment's own account does not cause forbidden effects because it does
not subsidize or suggest approval of the contractor's behavior.
There are a few flaws in the analogy. If the services provided in
Lemon were not, say, 1,000 hours of secular education but 900
hours mixed with 100 of religious indoctrination, then the govern-
ment would get no value for part of its dollar and would to that
extent be giving the school something for nothing.62 More impor-
tant, the government is not really buying for its own account in
these cases. Paying for the rooms (Grand Rapids) and providing
"secular educational services" (Lemon) are things the parochial
schools would do for their students anyway. So the government
really is giving them something for nothing-no change of behavior
on their part.63
3. Tax benefits. A third type of "financial assistance" problem is
the treatment of tax benefits. It now seems undisputed that tax
exemptions do not subject institutions to the requirements of Title
IX and its cognate statutes.64 The statutory language is fairly
clear. 6' Anyway, treating exemptions as subsidies assumes that
some ideal share of everyone's property and earnings already be-
longs to the government, which can hand out money by either
(i) releasing its claim or (ii) collecting on its claim and then giving
the money back.6 6 In deciding what should count as getting some-
61 Cook v. Budget Rent-A-Car Corp., 502 F. Supp. 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (§ 504); 28
C.F.R. § 41.3(e) (1984) ("any grant, loan, contract (other than a procurement contract...)")
(Department of Justice § 504 regulation).
62 Cf. Bernard B. v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 528 F. Supp. 125, 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1981),
aff'd, 679 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1982).
63 See New York v. Cathedral Academy, 434 U.S. 125, 134 (1977). A better Establish-
ment Clause analogy might be an Army base buying bread or brandy from local Benedictine
monks. Or maybe even Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291, 294 (1899).
' Paralyzed Veterans of America v. CAB, 752 F.2d 694, 709-710 (D.C. Cir. 1985),
cert. granted, No. 85-289 (Oct. 21, 1985); Bachman v. American Society of Clinical
Pathologists, 577 F. Supp. 1257, 1263-65 (D.N.J. 1983). McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F.
Supp. 448, 460-62 (D.D.C. 1972), held that some tax exemptions were tantamount to
"Federal financial assistance" for purposes of Title VI. The case was roundly criticized in
Bittker & Kaufman, Taxes and Civil Rights: "Constitutionalizing" the Internal Revenue
Code, 82 Yale L.J. 51 (1972), and has not been followed since.
65 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1982) equates "Federal financial assistance" with "grant, loan, or
contract other than a contract of insurance or guaranty." See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-l
(1982).
" Why stop there? One might with equal justification object that repeal of the income tax
would violate the Fifth Amendment since that-like an exemption-would release to dis-
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thing for nothing in this context, Congress and the courts seem to
agree that keeping "your own" money rather than paying it in taxes
does not count as "something."
The Court has reached a similar result in Establishment Clause
cases for similar reasons. As it said in Walz v. Tax Commissioner:
"The grant of a tax exemption is not sponsorship since the govern-
ment does not transfer part of its revenue to churches but simply
abstains from demanding that the church support the state." '67
C. WHO IS A "RECIPIENT"?
A persistent tactic of those who want to give aid to parochial
schools has been to structure the transaction so that the aid is
formally given to the child or to the parents. This approach has had
some, but not uniform, success. It was an argument the Court
rejected in Grand Rapids:68
Petitioners claim that the aid here, like the textbooks in Allen,
flows primarily to the students, not to the religious schools....
Where, as here, no meaningful distinction can be made between
aid to the student and aid to the school, "the concept of a loan to
individuals is a transparent fiction."
Identical questions have arisen under the antidiscrimination stat-
utes, and the results have been parallel. In both areas the difficulty
has been making a "meaningful distinction . . . between aid to the
student and aid to the school."
1. General purpose assistance for individuals. That there is a differ-
ence is not open to doubt. One who receives welfare69 or Social
Security 7° payments may spend them at a sexist institution without
subjecting himself or the institution to the requirements of Title
IX. And the same money can be given to a church or a parochial
school without creating any Establishment Clause questions. 71 The
criminating institutions money that belongs to the government. The argument would be
vulnerable to the objection that the government had no discriminatory intent, though that
claim might not be successful if the plaintiff chose his defendant carefully. See note 20supra.
67 397 U.S. 664, 675 (1970).
68 105 S.Ct. at 3229.
69 See Grove City, 104 S.Ct. at 1218 n.13.
70 See Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1983) (Title VI). See also 45 C.F.R.
Pt. 84, App. A, p. 302 (1984) (HHS § 504 regulation) (Medicare); 110 Cong. Rec. 10076
(1964) (letter of Atty. Gen. Kennedy regarding agricultural support payments) (Title VI).
71 See Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools, 56 Calif. L. Rev.
260, 316-17 (1968).
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government is not seen as the cause of forbidden effects in such
cases. The reason is that the law here, as elsewhere, is unwilling to
follow a chain of causation back beyond a voluntary and unforeseen
human act in order to explain or attribute responsibility.72 In mak-
ing such grants the government has no way of knowing how they
will be spent and no practical means of controlling expenditures.
The individual beneficiary chooses what to do with the money,
uninfluenced by anything the government has done. The case is
otherwise when the government gives aid directly to an institution
that propagates religion (or promotes discrimination). Then the
government should foresee, and can control, the effects of its ac-
tion. In fact, to take an intermediate case, the result is also different
when the government gives aid to individuals in a form that can
only be used at such an institution.73
2. Tax benefits for individuals. Let me first mention a problem one
step short of the intermediate case-tax breaks for individuals who
contribute money to religious or discriminating institutions. The
Court has never suggested that the charitable deduction for contri-
butions to churches is suspect under the First Amendment.74 And
in Mueller v. Allen it held that a deduction for tuition paid to paro-
chial (or other) schools was not forbidden aid to the schools.75 The
outcome seems to be the same when deductions are taken for con-
tributions to institutions that discriminate.7 6
One approach to justifying the practice has been to emphasize
" "If a guest sits down with a table laid with knife and fork and plunges the knife into his
hostess's breast, her death is not in any context thought of as caused by, or the effect or result
of the waiter's action in laying the table[.]" Hart & Honor6, Causation in the Law 66 (1959).
This is the paradigm adopted by the Court in Witters, note 32 supra, which approved the
expenditure of state vocational rehabilitation assistance money at a Bible college. 54 USLW
at 4136.
" "If the murder occurred in a prison dining hall .... where knives are never set on tables
and diners may be expected to get violent, then the laying of the table would be the abnormal
evefit of great explanatory power, and the provision of opportunity 'the cause.' The pertinent
principle here is that the more expectable human behavior is, whether voluntary or not, the les likely
it is to 'negative causal connection[.]" Feinberg, Doing and Deserving 166 (1970) (emphasis in
original).
" See Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 790 n.49.
7' 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
71 McGlotten v. Connally, note 64supra, which held that exemptions for fraternal organi-
zations counted as "financial assistance," also held that deductions for contributors subjected
such organizations to Title VI. 338 F. Supp. at 462. This conclusion, like the first, has never
been followed. The question can no longer arise under Title VI after Bob Jones University
v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983), though it may under Title IX, § 504, and the ADA.
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that (as with Social Security) the benefit to an institution is "ulti-
mately controlled by the private choices of individual parents."77
That will not work. The government knows exactly what parents
will take the deduction for (tuition); the only question is whether
they will take it. The real explanation for these cases is not that the
school is not a "recipient" but that tax deductions for con-
tributors-like tax exemptions for the schools-do not count as
"financial assistance."
3. Tuition. That explanation of the tax benefits rule is confirmed
by the intermediate case: tuition grants. Grove City held that a
college whose students paid for their education with Pell grants
"receive[d] Federal financial assistance" within the meaning of Title
IX.78 And Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist held that a New
York tuition reimbursement program for students at private grade
and high schools was really "assistance to private schools." 79 Such
grants are different from Social Security because the government
foresees, indeed intends, that they will be spent at educational
(parochial) institutions."0 On the other hand, such grants differ
from tax deductions because their effects are, as the Court put it in
Grand Rapids, "unmediated by the tax code."" l
" Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. at 400. Hence the emphasis, in all these "child benefit"
cases, on whether the aid is available to public as well as to private school children. Id. at 398;
Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 782-83 n.38. If it is, one can argue that the state doesn't really know
what use a parent will make of the aid (whether he will use it in public school, in a private
secular school, or in a parochial school), just as it does not know how Social Security benefits
will be spent. And so, the argument concludes, the state can't be considered the cause of any
unforeseen religious effects. See Witters, note 32 supra, at 4136-37.
78 104 S.Ct. at 1216-20.
79 413 U.S. at 783. The Court's summary affirmances in Americans United for Separation
of Church and State v. Blanton and in Smith v. University of North Carolina, note 32 supra,
might suggest that the Establishment Clause treats college scholarships differently. Both
cases at least hold that scholarships that college students may use at any public or private
school do not necessarily have an unconstitutional effect of promoting religion when they are
used at religious colleges. That, however, is entirely consistent with my point, which is
simply that a school is a "recipient" of aid when students spend scholarships there. As I shall
suggest later, to prove an Establishment Clause violation one must also show that the aid goes
to a "program or activity," within the "recipient" institution, where religious practices occur.
" "[G]eneral assistance programs, unlike student aid programs, [are] not designed to assist
colleges and universities .... [Individuals' eligibility for general assistance is not tied to
attendance at an educational institution." Grove City, 104 S.Ct. at 1218 n. 13. "[I1t is precisely
the function of New York's law to provide assistance to private schools, the great majority of
which are sectarian." Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 783.
81 105 S.Ct. at 3229 n. 13. I should here say something about the tax credit to parents that
was condemned in Nyquist. 413 U.S. at 789-794. Mueller v. Allen admitted that "the
economic consequences of [that] program [were] difficult to distinguish" from the deduction
that the Court upheld. 463 U.S. at 397 n.6. I agree. What made it impossible to sustain the
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4. Materials and services for individuals. These crucial features of
tuition grants are shared by books, bus rides, and other materials
and services (diagnosis, therapy, counseling, remedial help). All
those kinds of aid can be structured as assistance to child or parent,
but such an arrangement should not in itself exonerate the govern-
ment from responsibility for religious indoctrination. As may be
seen from column A and column B in table 1, however, the Court
has approved some such arrangements and not others. The reason
is that, under the Establishment Clause and under Title IX, there is
still a further question: whether the aid goes to any "program or
activity" where forbidden conduct is occurring.
D. WHAT "PROGRAM OR ACTIVITY" IS ASSISTED?
Like the "financial assistance" and "recipient" rules, the "pro-
gram or activity" rule is concerned with the effects of government
aid. The "financial assistance" rule eliminates certain government
actions (procurement, tax exemptions) as not causally relevant. The
"recipient" rule deals with aid delivered to institutions through
intermediaries, who may sometimes sever the causal nexus. The
"program or activity" rule assumes that there are discontinuities
within institutions-that aid to one aspect of a school's affairs does
not necessarily produce effects everywhere else in the school.
Seven theories have been used to explain what intrainstitutional
effects are forbidden.
1. Purpose. The most obvious reason for holding government
responsible for private discrimination, or private religious activity,
is that it has intended its assistance to cause such effects. One
would expect the law to be rather unforgiving in blaming govern-
ment for effects when it has such a purpose, much as it is in
blaming a defendant for remote damages caused by intentional torts
or in finding complicity in someone else's criminal conduct.8 2 The
credit in A'.quist was that it was integrated with the system of tuition grants to produce a
carefully graduated benefit scale. 413 U.S. at 764-67. To have held only the grants invalid
would have eliminated benefits for the poor (those with incomes of less than $5,000) while
approving them for the rich. That was something the Court just couldn't bring itself to do.
2 See, e.g., A.L.I. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 435B, comment a (1965) ("responsibil-
ity for harmful consequences should be carried further in the case of one who does an
intentionally wrongful act than in the case of one who is merely negligent or is not at fault");
A.L.I. Model Penal Code and Commentaries (Official Draft and Revised Comments) § 2.06,
comment 6(b) (1985) ("One who solicits an end, or aids or agrees to aid in its achievement, is
an accomplice in whatever means may be employed, insofar as they constitute or commit an
offense fairly envisaged in the purpose of the association.").
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issue is pretty much hypothetical, though. The courts rarely find
evil intentions in government assistance programs. 83
2. Opportunity. As a practical matter, when we say that the gov-
ernment has caused improper "effects" we do not mean that its
conscious objective is to achieve such results. We do not even mean
that the government has unwittingly made something happen.
There are voluntary actions by people in the institution that inter-
vene between the government's act and its "effects," 8 4 and it would
be strange to say that the government "made" those people engage
in religious or discriminatory activity. What we really mean, most
often, is that the government has provided an opportunity for the
institution to misbehave. It is as though the government has left the
keys in a parked car, which a thief drives away. Or better, it is like
the opportunity for harm that a Dram Shop Act seeks to prevent.85
Suppose that a bartender gives his customer a free drink (to make
the dram shop case look like "financial assistance" rather than pro-
curement). The most obvious cause-and-effect relation envisioned
by a Dram Shop Act is that the customer will get drunk and injure
himself or someone else. If he does, the bartender is held responsi-
ble. Other consequences are possible too. The customer may linger
over his drink, when he should be at work, and get fired. Or he
may spend the money he saves on his free drink with a bookmaker.
But we would not say that the bartender was the cause of the
customer's unemployment or gambling. Those harms do not ex-
ploit the dangerous aspects of the opportunity that he provided.
The Opportunity Theory envisions something like the first type
of harm in this example. Title IX worries in large part that custom-
ers (recipients) will put the sustenance they are given (federal dol-
8' The purpose prong of the Lemon test has been invoked only in cases where the govern-
ment itself has engaged in religious activity. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S.Ct. 2479
(1985); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980). At the time Title VI was passed there were
several federal aid programs that authorized recipients to spend assistance under a "separate
but equal" formula, 7 U.S.C. § 323 (1958) (Second Morrill Act); 20 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(F)
(1958) (impact aid); 42 U.S.C. § 291e(f) (1958) (Hill-Burton Act), and much was made of
these in the debates. 110 Cong. Rec. 1527-1528 (Rep. Celler), 6544 (Sen. Humphrey), 7054,
7057, 7062 (Sen. Pastore) (1964). We have problems nowadays, but not of this kind.
84 In the "recipient" problems discussed above there are actually two intervening volun-
tary actions: one by the individual who first gets the assistance and one by the institution to
which it is remitted.
ss But with this difference: in the parochial school case we take away the bartender's
license (declare the aid statute unconstitutional); in the discrimination case we only take away
the customer's drink (revoke the aid).
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lars) to harmful use (discrimination).86 To avoid that harm it
suffices to trace the federal dollars and insist that they be spent for
proper purposes.
If this were the only harm Title IX was concerned with, the term
"program or activity" would refer to the federal grant program
(e.g., Pell grants) rather than to some program conducted by the
recipient (a college financial aid program) that includes both federal
and school money. It would not matter if the recipient caused harm
with its own time or money; what would count is what it did with
the drink. Many of the early Title VI cases emphasized this point, 7
though the Supreme Court took a broader view in Grove City.
The Court has also flirted with the Opportunity Theory for aid
to religious colleges. Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Board held
that a state could give noncategorical grants to private (including
religious) colleges, provided the schools segregated the funds in
separate accounts, agreed not to spend the money for sectarian
purposes, and accounted for the funds at the end of the year.88 The
important thing was the assurance that the government's money
would not itself be misused: "if secular activities can be separated
out, they . . .may be funded."89
86 "That principle is [that] taxpayers' money, which is collected without discrimination,
shall be spent without discrimination." 110 Cong. Rec. 7064 (1964) (Sen. Ribicoff) (Title
VI). "Here we have this scholarship money-much of it federal-going to students. Which
students receive this scholarship money is decided upon by the individual colleges and
universities-where there are often quota restrictions on women recipients." Discrimination
Against Women: Hearings on Section 805 of H.R. 16098 Before the Special Subcomm. on
Education of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., Pt. 1, at 235
(1970) (Rep. May) (Title IX).
7 See, e.g., Board of Public Instruction of Taylor County, Fla. v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068,
1077 (5th Cir. 1969) ("the school lunch program, * * * the agricultural extension program for
home economics teachers, * * * the farm-to-market road program"). This is also the most
natural reading of some of the statutory language. Title IX speaks, for example, of "termina-
tion of ... assistance under such program or activity to any recipient" and says that termina-
tion reports have to be filed "with the committees on the House and Senate having legislative
jurisdiction over the program or activity involved[.I" 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1982) (emphasis
added).
'8 426 U.S. 736 (1976). Regan upheld cash payments to lower schools on the same theory.
The payments there were reimbursement for the costs of recordkeeping and of administering
and grading state-prepared tests. 444 U.S. at 657-59.
89 Id. at 755 (opinion of Blackmun, J.) (emphasis omitted). Roemer was a challenge to
Maryland's statute on its face, so the Court had no occasion to say how much space had to be
left around secular activities when they were "separated out"-e.g., whether the entire
French department (the recipient's "program") had to be free of religious taint before money
could be spent there. If it did, the relevant effects would include not just opportunities but
also symbolism. See pages 83-85 infra.
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The government can often avoid the consequences of this theory
by providing assistance in kind rather than in cash. That technique
has succeeded for books, tests, and diagnostic services delivered to
parochial schools on their premises (see col. A, table 1). Such aid is
thought to be self-policing: it does not create any opportunity for
abuse and so cannot be said to cause any forbidden effects. It is as
though the bartender in the dram shop gave his customer a glass of
water rather than something more potent. But Grand Rapids, like
Grove City, takes a view of forbidden effects that is broader than the
Opportunity Theory allows for. The Court does not look only at
the government grant program.
3. Infection. One justification for reaching out beyond the grant
program to other parts of the institution might be called the Infec-
tion Theory. The idea is that misbehavior elsewhere in the school
(upstream, as it were, from the grant program) can infect the use of
government funds and should therefore be covered as well. The
Infection Theory thus adds one link to the chain described in the
previous section.
An example under Title IX is admissions. In Cannon v. University
of Chicago the Court allowed a female applicant to challenge a med-
ical school's admissions practices without any showing that federal
money was spent on admissions.9" The reason may have been that
federal aid was extended to other parts of the medical school, and
the school would give it all to men if women could not get in the
front door.91 A more difficult infection question would be pre-
sented if the medical school got federal money to teach anatomy
and discriminated against women by barring them from a school
honor society. 92
In deciding whether Title IX covers such outside activities, these
cases have not insisted on a showing that federal money was mis-
spent. They have instead relied on regulations-delineating the
90 441 U.S. 677, 680-81 (1979).
9l Rice v. President and Fellows ofHarvard College, 663 F.2d 336, 339 n.2 (lst Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 456 U.S. 928 (1982); Othen v. Ann Arbor School Board, 507 F. Supp. 1376,
1388 (E.D. Mich. 1981), aff'd, 699 F.2d 309 (6th Cir. 1983). Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S.
455, 469 (1973), applied this same theory as a matter of constitutional (rather than statutory)
law to racially segregated schools.
92 See Iron Arrow Honor Soc. v. Heckler, 702 F.2d 549 (5th Cir. Unit B), vacated and
remanded, 104 S.Ct. 373 (1983).
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path that infection can be expected to follow 93 -that permit them
to assume that the ultimate forbidden effect (abuse of the federal
grant funds) occurs once discrimination is shown outside the grant
program.
Grand Rapids relied on the Infection Theory for its first effects
argument. The Court found that "the presence of the [parochial
school] environment" might cause even public school teachers to
"conform their instruction to the environment."94 There is a kind of
fox-guarding-the-chickens plausibility to this with regard to the
Community Education program, which was taught in large part by
parochial school teachers hired pro hac vice by the school district. It
is downright implausible as to the Shared Time program, which
was taught almost entirely by full-time public employees who
had no connection whatever with the schools to which they were
assigned. 95
The presumption that infection would occur is not just implaus-
ible; it is contradicted by the evidence of nineteen years' experience
with the Title I program in Aguilar.96 And there are no agency
regulations on which the Court can rely, as it does in discrimination
cases, for support of its unproved empirical assumptions. One may
ask why, in that event, the Court adhered to this dubious causal
inference. The answer is the entanglement theory, which, as I will
show, disqualified the Court from looking at the evidence. The
situation is a bit like the flat-earth problem in the thirteenth cen-
tury. The Court has adopted a view of the world that is immune
from refutation because the very nature of the Court's view makes
it unwilling to gather evidence.
4. Benefits. This theory is something like the Infection Theory
run in reverse. The Infection Theory holds that discrimination (or
religion) upstream from the grant program can flow into and cor-
rupt it. The Benefits Theory holds that an innocent grant program
'3 See Iron Arrow, 702 F.2d at 554; 34 C.F.R. § 106.31(b)(7) (1984) (school support of
student social organizations); 34 C.F.R. § 106.15(c) (1984) (ED Title IX admissions regula-
tion); 45 C.F.R. § 84.42(a) (1984) (HHS § 504 admissions regulation).
4 105 S.Ct. at 3225, quoting Wolman, 433 U.S. at 247. The Court reached the same
conclusion in Meek, 421 U.S. at 370-72, and Lemon, 403 U.S. at 617.
9' See 105 S.Ct. at 3231 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
96 105 S.Ct. at 3245 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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can sometimes provide a benefit to discrimination (or religion) that
occurs downstream. This theory has had mixed success in discrimi-
nation law, but more in religion cases.
One example of the Benefits Theory is tuition grants, which can
be passed on from one program to another. Grove City rejected the
argument that Title IX should cover every classroom and activity at
the college because Pell grants went from the financial aid office
into the general operating budget and out again in every direction.97
Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist reached the opposite con-
clusion about tuition grants to parochial school students.98
A different kind of example concerns government aid that is used
up in program x with side effects on program y. Suppose that the
government gives money for teaching math classes and that stu-
dents who take the classes do better in physics as a result. The Title
IX regulations suggest that both physics and math are covered.9 9 It
is not clear whether they survive Grove City. Grand Rapids may also
have had something like this in mind when it said that "state pro-
grams providing [instructional materials and services] advance[] the
'primary, religion-oriented educational function of the sectarian
school.' " 0 The Court may have meant that remedial reading
classes make the school's own reading classes a more effective way
of putting religion across.
The Benefits Theory of causation depends (as the Infection
Theory does) on the more basic idea of providing an opportunity
that the institution can exploit for purposes of discrimination or
religion. The fear about tuition grants is that the school will mis-
spend the government's money after moving it from one pocket to
another. Insofar as it lends itself to that abuse, tuition looks like
noncategorical aid that can benefit almost any part of the institu-
11 "[We] have found no persuasive evidence suggesting that Congress intended that the
Department's regulatory authority follow federally aided students from classroom to class-
room, building to building, or activity to activity." 104 S.Ct. at 1222.
98 "The tuition grants here are subject to no ... restrictions. There has been no endeavor
'to guarantee the separation between secular and religious educational functions and to
ensure that State financial aid supports only the former.' " 413 U.S. at 783.
99 34 C.F.R. § 106.11 (1984): "This Part ... applies to every recipient and to each
education program or activity operated by such recipient which receives or benefits from
Federal financial assistance."
'00 105 S.Ct. at 3229, quoting Meek, 421 U.S. at 364.
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tion, and there is some sense in following it into every classroom as
Nyquist does."°"
The problem of side effects is more difficult. Suppose that the
physics building at Grove City College is inaccessible to the handi-
capped. We might hold the government responsible for that if it
paid for the physics building. But if it has only given money for
teaching math, the opportunity that the school abuses is not the
government assistance itself. It is a side effect (benefit) of that assis-
tance that the school prevents the handicapped from utilizing. So
too with remedial reading and religion: the parochial school does
not touch the remedial reading classes but puts one of their benefits
(increased literacy) to use in other classes where it teaches reli-
gion. 10 2
These arguments stretch the idea of causation quite far. There is
a sense in which Grand Rapids has contributed to the propagation
of religious faith. But it has in the same sense contributed to the
spread of pornography, the belief in creationism, and the growth of
the Republican party since those are all things that increased liter-
acy will lead one to read about.
5. Freed-up funds. In holding that the Grand Rapids programs
were an "indirect subsidy" to parochial schools °3 the Court may
have had in mind not the Benefits Theory but a different kind of
10 The contrary outcome in Grove City was based on indications of congressional intent
(104 S.Ct. at 1221-22) that do not apply to Establishment Clause questions. The result is
also different under the Establishment Clause where tuition assistance is given to students at
religious colleges. See col. A. Since the cases approving such aid were only summary
affirmances, see note 32 supra, one can only speculate about the reasons. One possible
explanation is that in such cases, unlike primary and secondary school cases, the schools are
not "pervasively sectarian." See Aguilar, 105 S.Ct. at 3237. It is thus far less certain that
tuition funds, even after having been moved around from one program to another, will end
up benefiting religious activity. This matters because we are less willing to attribute respon-
sibility to the government for effects it cannot foresee when it acts-particularly if they are
produced by another institution's intervening voluntary choice. See text at notes 107-10
iynfra. The district court in Smnitb emphasized that the tuition aid there could not be spent at a
seminary or bible college-institutions that, like lower parochial schools, would be perva-
sively sectarian. 429 F. Supp. at 872. But cf. Witters v. Washington Department of Services
for the Blind, note 32 supra.
10' Another possible side effect in the religion cases, more remote still, is that the remedial
reading program paid for by the government will make it more likely that children will
attend parochial school and receive the religious instruction offered in other classes there.
That is a consequence the Court has not found sufficient in other cases. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at
775; Allen, 392 U.S. at 244; Everson, 330 U.S. at 17.
103 105 S.Ct. at 3229 n.12.
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ripple effect. The Freed-up Funds Theory says that, even if the
government aid is not itself abused, and even if it has no benefits
that spill over into other programs, the institution may work new
harm with the money that government aid displaces in its budget.
If the federal government gives a college $500,000 to spend on
teaching physics, the college may then take $500,000 of its own
money out of the physics budget to spend on men's athletics. The
Freed-up Funds Theory is one that several courts found persuasive
in antidiscrimination cases' °4 before the Supreme Court rejected it
in Grove City. The movement in religion cases has been in the
opposite direction: the Court consistently rejected the theory be-
fore Grand Rapids,' °5 which might be understood to have resur-
rected it.
Like the Benefits Theory, this theory holds that the government
causes all the ripple effects that flow from its assistance. Grove City
picks out two obvious weaknesses with this idea. First, the govern-
ment aid may not really cause any diversion of funds. 106 If someone
gives me an automatic garage door opener, I won't have more
money to spend on other things, if I should never have purchased a
garage door opener for myself. Second, if money is freed up, it may
be very hard to tell where it goes, and it may not go toward forbid-
den acts. 1O7 This matters because we are less willing to attribute
responsibility for effects one cannot foresee when he acts-
particularly if they are produced by another person's intervening
voluntary choice. (Remember the problem of Social Security.) We
would not say that the bartender was the cause of the customer's
gambling, even though the customer may have had no funds to
gamble with had the bartender not given him a free drink.
If we assume that parochial schools are "pervasively sectar-
'o See, e.g., Grove City College v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684, 696 (3d Circ. 1982), rev'd, 104
S.Ct. 1211 (1984) (Title IX); Haffer v. Temple University, 688 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1982) (Title
IX); Wright v. Columbia University, 520 F. Supp. 789, 792 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (§ 504); Poole v.
South Plainfield Bd. of Ed., 490 F. Supp. 948, 951 (D.N.J. 1980) (§ 504); Bob Jones
University v. Johnson, 396 F. Supp. 597, 602 (D.S.C. 1974), aff'd, 529 F.2d 514 (4th Cir.
1975) (Title VI).
1o See, e.g., Regan, 444 U.S. at 658; Roemer, 426 U.S. at 747 (plurality opinion); Hant, 413
U.S. at 743; Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 775; Tilton, 403 U.S. at 679 (plurality opinion); Lemon, 403
U.S. at 664 (opinion of White, J.). Cf. Catbedral Academy, 434 U.S. at 134.
106 104 S.Ct. at 1221.
107 Ibid.
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ian, ' this second point loses force. In that case the government
might foresee that almost anything for which the freed-up funds
will be spent will be religious. But there are still several problems
with saying that the government has caused religious effects. In
other religion cases, 10 9 as in Grove City, the Court has not been
willing to assume that government aid for nonessentials actu-
ally frees up funds. And the evidence in Grand Rapids showed that
the parochial schools had not previously offered the challenged
courses. The Court's response was that there was no way of know-
ing that they would not have done so in the future''-a kind of
counterfactual conditional not subject to rebuttal.
A third kind of problem with the Freed-up Funds Theory is that
it applies to a surprising variety of causes. One may say that reme-
dial reading services free up money for teaching religion, but one
could with equal justice point to city sewer services as a cause of the
same effect. If the city did not provide sewer service, the parochial
schools would have to install septic tanks, and you can buy a lot of
catechisms for what you'd spend on a septic tank.1 '
It is true that reading is part of the curriculum (a point empha-
sized in Grand Rapids) and sewers are not. 12 But that actually counts
against this theory. When school money earmarked for septic tanks
is freed up and spent on religion, there is a net gain in funded
religious activity. School money budgeted for the curriculum,
however, is already going for religious activity, 113 so moving it
somewhere else may cause no new harm. If the Shared Time pro-
gram has actually erased religion from "10 percent of the school
day,""' 4 it is queer to say that the program has caused religious
effects simply because the school looks for a way to make up the
time.
'o Grand Rapids, 105 S.Ct. at 3223.
o See, e.g., Allen, 392 U.S. at 244 n.6.
"1o 105 S.Ct. at 3230.
"' This argument impressed the Court in Regan, 444 U.S. at 658 & n.6, and Roemer, 426
U.S. at 747 (opinion of Blackmun, J.).
..2 105 S.Ct. at 3230.
1'3 That is the basic assumption behind saying that the government cannot aid the school's
"educational function" (105 S.Ct. at 3229)-the curriculum is "pervasively sectarian" (id. at
3223).
114 105 S.Ct. at 3230.
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6. Proof problems. The paradigm cause-and-effect relation in all
the theories I have discussed so far is one where the government
provides an opportunity for harm that the institution exploits. For
all of these theories the relevant "program or activity" is the govern-
ment grant program, though activities elsewhere in the institution
may also be covered if they infect, or benefit from, or are funded by
money freed up by, the government's program. But suppose that
the government contributes half the cost of building a school li-
brary and that the school contributes the other half. It would be
arbitrary, given the way libraries are built and paid for, to say that
the government's money built one part of the library and the
school's another or that the government's money paid for the first
twenty years of its useful life and the school's for the remainder.
Even if the effect we worry about is misuse of the government's
money, the impossibility of tracing it requires us to say that the
"program or activity" here is the recipient's program, not the grant
program. This is what the antidiscrimination regulations and the
Establishment Clause cases say about construction grants. 115
Grand Rapids and Aguilar may accept a variation on this theory.
One way of expressing their conclusion is to say that the relevant
"program or activity" is the school's entire educational program,"6
not the government assistance program. But one cannot rely on the
Proof Problems Theory for that conclusion. There was no ambi-
guity in either case, as there is with construction grants, about
where the government's money went. Nor was there any ambi-
guity in the other cases (see col. B, table 1) where states supplied
materials or services, rather than cash, for use on the parochial
school premises. The question in all these cases was not where the
assistance went but whether harm occurred (whether religion was
sponsored by the government's contribution).
The Court said in Grand Rapids that it can be hard to prove the
fact of harm, just as it is hard to trace government funds. We
cannot require taxpayer plaintiffs to show harm in schools they do
not attend, the argument went, when no one at the school has an
115 As to paying for part of a building, compare Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 774-79, with 45
C.F.R. § 80.5(e) (HHS Title VI regulation). As to paying for part ofa building's useful life,
compare Tilton, 403 U.S. at 674-75, 681-84, with 34 C.F.R. § 106.4(b)(1) (ED Title IX
regulation).
116 105 S.Ct. at 3229 ("educational function").
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incentive to report abuses. 7 But the government itself can monitor
for harm, as it did in Aguilar.' s The real reason the Court pre-
sumed harm was not proof problems but the discovery process.
Aguilar makes this clear: 9
When the state [monitors for harm] the freedom of religious
belief of those who are not adherents of that denomination suf-
fers, even when the governmental purpose underlying the in-
volvement is largely secular. In addition, the freedom of even the
adherents of the denomination is limited by the governmental
intrusion into sacred matters.
The solution to the discovery problem is the same as the solution
to the proof problem: define "program or activity" more broadly
than the government assistance program. The outer limits are fixed
by the area in which discovery is likely to cause problems. In lower
school cases the program is the education program on the school
premises. In the case of colleges, which are not "pervasively sectar-
ian," discovery presents no problem and this theory does not apply.
Whether this variation on the Proof Problems Theory is a con-
vincing reason for expanding the notion of "program or activity"
depends on the assumption that discovery really does cause prob-
lems. I will argue later that it does not.
7. Symbolism. The other effect on which Grand Rapids relied,
unlike all of those up to this point, has nothing to do with the
recipient abusing opportunities. The Court said that the govern-
ment would also improperly aid religion if it "convey[ed] a message
of ... endorsement or disapproval of religion." In Grand Rapids the
message was sent via symbols: "the symbolic union of church and
state" in one joint enterprise. 20 It's as though the school paid for
religious activity with its own money, but its partner the govern-
ment said, "We are in this together."
In this instance, as in the last (Proof Problems), the relevant "pro-
gram or activity" is not the government grant program but some-
thing broader-the joint venture in which government and school
117 105 S.Ct. at 3225-26.
"' "[The supervision in this case would assist in preventing the Title I program from
being used, intentionally or unwittingly, to inculcate the religious beliefs of the surrounding
parochial school." 105 S.Ct. at 3236-37.
"9 Id. at 3237.
120 105 S.Ct. at 3226.
are engaged. This might explain why Grove City held the college's
financial aid program, not just the Pell grant program, subject to
Title IX. "' To hold otherwise could suggest that the government
approved of sex discrimination carried on by the school with its
own scholarship funds.
The obvious problem with the implementation of this theory is
defining the scope of the joint venture. In Grove City it did not
encompass any classes the school gave, even though the govern-
ment was paying tuition for all of them. In Grand Rapids it seemed
to include all classes, even though the government was only offer-
ing a few. The Court said that the scope of the joint venture there
was determined by the public's (and especially the parochial school
student's) perception: 122
[The question] is whether the symbolic union ... is sufficiently
likely to be perceived by adherents of the controlling denomina-
tions as an endorsement, and by the nonadherents as a disap-
proval, of their individual religious choices .... The symbolism
... is most likely to influence children of tender years.
I am not sure that a Gallup poll would measure this effect any
better than the Court's intuitive method does, but my own intui-
tion is different. The private religious activities of the government's
joint venturers are, unlike discrimination, something the Constitu-
tion protects and deems valuable. That is why Norwood v. Harrison
said that government can give free books to religious schools but
not to segregated schools. 1 23 So, if English classes are not covered in
Grove City, a fortiori they should not be covered in Grand Rapids. It
is harder to see endorsement when the government's partner does
things the government has no control over than when it does things
the government could forbid but does not.
There is another difficulty with the Court's conclusion about
symbolic effects. Remember that we are speculating about people's
impressions of how the government views its joint venturer's reli-
121 The Court did not say why it chose the recipient's program, rather than the grant
program, as the relevant unit for purposes of coverage. It simply said that "students who
participate in the College's federally assisted financial aid program but who do not them-
selves receive federal funds lare] protected against discrimination on the basis of sex." 104
S.Ct. at 1221 n.21. Some of the statutory language supports this conclusion. Section 901(a)
speaks, for example, of an "education program or activity receiving Federal financial assis-
tance." 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1982). But see note 87 supra.
122 105 S.Ct. at 3226.
123 Note 91 supra.
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gious activity. It seems as though the government could neutralize
any symbolic effects by making perfectly clear that it did not ap-
prove of what its partner was doing. New York succeeded fairly
well at that in Aguilar: "[T]he religious school... must endure the
ongoing presence of state personnel whose primary purpose is to
monitor teachers and students in an attempt to guard against the
infiltration of religious thought."' 24 No one would suppose that the
government in that case applauded the schools' religious activities.
But this most obvious means of neutralizing symbolic effects is
forbidden by the entanglement rules.
E. REPRISE
The antiestablishment and antidiscrimination principles are suf-
ficiently similar that one could restate the Lemon test in the terms
used by Title IX without causing any real change in the results of
the cases. 125 The rephrased test would read:
No person in the United States shall . . . be [given religious
instruction] in ... any education program or activity receiving
Federal [or State] financial assistance.
With but one exception the terms "financial assistance," "receiv-
ing," and "program or activity" have the same meaning and scope
as they do under Title IX. The exception is that, in cases involving
aid to parochial grade and high schools, the term "education pro-
gram or activity" means the entire on-premises educational func-
tion of the school. 126 Any government contribution to on-premises
education must be cut off because students are receiving religious
instruction in that program.
This reading of "program or activity" is broader than what Grove
City says Title IX would require. Under the antidiscrimination
124 105 S.Ct. at 3239.
225 This is slightly overstated. See note 126 infra.
226 Education assistance (therapeutic, counseling, remedial, accelerated, and supplemental
services) can be given to parochial school students off campus. See col. A. Bus rides for field
trips do not fall within this category, perhaps because the teacher goes along. See col. B and
Wohnan, 433 U.S. at 253. Aid that does not contribute to the educational process (lunch,
diagnostic services) can be provided on campus. See col. A. Given this expansive definition
of "education program or activity," I cannot account for allowing books or tests (nor reim-
bursement for tests). See col. A. But the Court has as much as said that it cannot either,
Wolman, 433 U.S. at 252 n. 18, so I shall not apologize for this shortcoming. See also note 81
supra (on the problem of tax credits).
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principle it would be appropriate to distinguish between a high
school's industrial arts program, or its athletics program, and its
program for use of Title I funds. 127 As the Court said in Grove City,
"[Wie have found no persuasive evidence suggesting that Congress
intended that the Department's regulatory authority follow feder-
ally aided students from classroom to classroom . . . or activity to
activity. '
This difference between parochial school and Title IX cases re-
sults from the Court's greater willingness to find intrainstitutional
religious effects under nearly all of the "program or activity" theo-
ries I discussed. In Grand Rapids the Court assumed that the paro-
chial school atmosphere would infect Shared Time, notwithstand-
ing a lack of evidence on that point (Infection Theory). It said that
both Shared Time and Community Education would have ripple
effects (Benefits or Freed-up Funds) that promoted religion. But
there was no evidence that funds were actually freed up or that, if
they were, their expenditure resulted in a net increase in religious
activity.129 In fact the Court dispensed altogether with proof of
harm because it believed that the process of discovering harm
would itself be detrimental to religion (Proof Problems). Finally,
the Court worried about symbolic effects in Grand Rapids (Symbol-
ism), though neither evidence nor intuition supported its concerns.
And it forbade in Aguilar the very means for countering any sym-
bolic effects that might occur.
To put it more briefly, the chief difference between parochial
school and Title IX cases is that the former make strained assump-
tions about cause and effect that the entanglement rule precludes
people from disproving. The decision in parochial school aid cases
must depend entirely, as it did in Grand Rapids, on "risks" rather
than on "effects," on what "might" happen rather than on what
did. 130
127 See, e.g., Dougherty County School System v. Bell, 694 F.2d 78, 81 (5th Cir. 1982);
Finch, note 87 supra, 414 F.2d at 1078; Othen, note 91 supra, 507 F. Supp. at 1380.
128 104 S.Ct. at 1222.
129 And the benefits-things like literacy-have such a variety of applications that it seems
arbitrary to pick out religious belief as the effect they primarily advance.
"' See, e.g., 105 S.Ct. at 3223-24 ("may impermissibly advance religion"; "teachers ...
may become involved"; "programs may provide a crucial symbolic link"; "programs may...
provid[e] a subsidy"). As to the problem of infection, see id. at 3224-26 ("an unacceptable
risk"; "[tihepotential for impermissible fostering of religion"; "too great a risk"; "a substantial
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III. ENTANGLEMENT
Aguilar said that the entanglement rule rested on two con-
cerns that prevented the collection of evidence about improper ef-
fects. Both rely on unsupported speculation that other kinds of
forbidden effects will occur if the government tries to monitor the
services it provides. One concern is that the government, in ad-
ministering assistance, will show too much favor for the recipient
and thereby threaten nonmembers of the sect. The other is that
"the freedom of even the adherents of the [school's] denomination is
limited by governmental intrusion into sacred matters."
13
A. CAPTURE
The first entanglement problem mentioned in Aguilar concerned
the effect that administration of the aid program might have on
people outside the school: 132
When the state becomes enmeshed with a given denomination in
matters of religious significance, the freedom of religious belief
of those who are not adherents of that denomination suffers,
even when the governmental purpose underlying the involve-
ment is largely secular.
The phrase "enmeshed. . in matters of religious significance" here
refers to the issues that may arise when program administrators
monitor teachers and classrooms to make sure that religion does not
creep in.
The Court did not explain how this harm would come about,
though one proposal has been that it is like the "capture" of admin-
istrative agencies by those they are supposed to regulate. 33 Or to
put the same idea in the terms I have been using, it's the Infection
risk"; "the pressures of the environment migbt alter his behavior"; "[t]eachers ... may well
subtly . .. conform their instruction"; "the absence of proof of specific incidents is not disposi-
tire.") As to the problem of symbolism, see id. at 3226-27 ("sufficiently likely"; "students
would be unlikely to discern the.., difference"). As to the problem of subsidy, see id. at 3230
("there is no way ofkno-wing whether the religious schools would have offered some or all of
these courses"; the schools "could surely discontinue existing courses"; approval here would
"let the genie out of the bottle").
"1 105 S.Ct. at 3237.
132 Ibid.
1'3 Nowak, The Supreme Court, the Religion Clauses and the Nationalization of Educa-
tion, 70 Nw. L. Rev. 883, 904 (1976).
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Theory at one remove. The Infection Theory says that public
school teachers working in the Title I program in parochial schools
may be swept up in the sectarian spirit of the enterprise and modify
their instruction along religious lines. This variation says that ad-
ministrators who go into the parochial schools to make sure that
does not happen will catch the same bug and ignore or approve
abuses they see in the program.
We have heard this kind of thing in school aid cases for so long
now that I think we are inured to how really extraordinary it is.
Suppose, just to make it sound fresh, that we transpose the same
idea to Title IX. The modified Infection Theory in that context
would say that a school subject to Title IX could for that very
reason not receive federal aid because, in the process of looking for
sex discrimination, Department of Education officials might be
captured by chauvinists. I do not mean to deny that the problem of
"capture" is sometimes a real one. But the mere possibility that it
will occur cannot be a sufficient reason for refusing to give govern-
ment aid because any program for giving assistance to institutions
will require government supervision to assure that the aid is not
abused. The only sensible solution' 34 is to deal with the problem if
and when it happens by cutting off aid to the captors.
There is one possible difference between the two cases. Aguilar
stressed that parochial schools are "pervasively sectarian,"'1 35 and
Title IX recipients are by and large not pervasively discrimina-
tory. Perhaps capture is so much more likely in the former kind of
case that it is not worth running the risk. The Court's treatment of
religious colleges is consistent with this idea. They, unlike lower
schools, are not "pervasively sectarian," and so the Court does not
worry much about entanglement. 136
The problem with this hypothesis is that it does nothing to ex-
plain why capture is more likely in a case like Aguilar. The people
at risk there-Title I administrators-were supervising public
school teachers, and it is hard to see a threat of entanglement in the
government supervising its own employees. It does that in the
public schools. The only contacts Title I administrators had with
"' "Deregulation" is not an option.
135 105 S.Ct. at 3237.
136 See 105 S.Ct. at 3237-38. See also Roemer, 426 U.S. at 758-59; Tilton, 403 U.S. at
684-89; and Hunt, 413 U.S. at 745-49.
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parochial school personnel (the only time they risked capture or
infection) concerned the time and place for classes, the choice of
students, and reporting about performance.' 37 The latter two are
things that would happen even if parochial school students went
outside the building for Title I instruction. And none of those
contacts can remotely be considered a "matter of religious signifi-
cance."
The "capture" argument is so implausible that it is hard to be-
lieve that this first entanglement concern should make any differ-
ence. And in fairness to the Court, I must say that the opinion in
Aguilar did not dwell on it. It was more interested in a second
variety.
B. INSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY
In addition to its statutory arguments against Title IX coverage,
Grove City College claimed "that conditioning federal assistance on
compliance with Title IX infringe[d] First Amendment rights of
the College and its students[.]"' 3" The school did not contend that it
had a right to discriminate against women. On the contrary, it said
that "to engage in discrimination . . . would be repugnant to [its]
moral principles[.]"' 39 Instead it argued that pervasive regulation by
the Department of Education to enforce Title IX "would imper-
missibly interfere with the College's autonomy and the values
which it seeks to promote among its students."' 0 Those values
derived in large measure from religious principles (Grove City is
affiliated with the United Presbyterian Church), 4 ' but the First
Amendment freedom the school feared for was academic and asso-
ciational rather than religious.' 42
1"7 105 S.Ct. at 3239.
'"" 104 S.Ct. at 1223.
139 Pet. Br. 48, Grove City College v. Bell, 104 S.Ct. 1211 (1984). The case arose out of
the college's refusal to execute an Assurance of Compliance with Title IX. The Department
of Education then began administrative proceedings to terminate financial assistance (Pell
grants) to the college and its students. Departmental regulations and the statute authorize
termination for failure to execute an Assurance. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1982); 34 C.F.R. § 106.4
(1984); 104 S.Ct. at 1222-23. There was thus no claim that the college had actually dis-
criminated.
"4' Grove City College v. Bell, 687 F.2d at 701.
14, Id. at 688, 701 n.29.
142 Id. at 701.
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The Court gave a short but sufficient answer to this claim:143
Congress is free to attach reasonable and unambiguous condi-
tions to federal financial assistance that educational institutions
are not obligated to accept. Grove City may terminate its partici-
pation in the [Pell grant] program and thus avoid the require-
ments of [Title IX]. Students affected by the Department's ac-
tion may either take their [Pell grants] elsewhere or attend Grove
City without federal financial assistance.
Since the college had no obligation to accept federal assistance in
the first place, it could easily avoid the restrictions that it found so
bothersome. In any event, Title IX's restrictions were quite "rea-
sonable," given the Court's holding that the statute only covered
Grove City's financial aid program. If the college accepted federal
money, it could "segregate its activities according to the source of
its funding"" and would remain free to do as it wished outside the
boundaries of the federally assisted program.
Grove City's argument has a familiar ring to it. It is the second
entanglement argument the Court made in Aguilar: that "[a] com-
prehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance""14 is
"pregnant with dangers of excessive government direction of
church schools."' 4 6 The peculiar thing about the argument in reli-
gion cases is that it is never made by the schools, as it was in Grove
City. It is instead made by plaintiffs challenging school aid, and
accepted by the Court, in order to protect "the freedom of religious
belief of . . . the denomination[s]" running the schools. 147 That
peculiarity seems to make the argument even weaker. If the govern-
ment can attach restrictions to aid over the recipient's objection
without violating the First Amendment, it should certainly be able
to do so with the recipient's consent.
There are several differences between the two cases that might
make the analogy inapt. One is that the conditions on grants to
parochial schools might not be as "reasonable" as they are in Title
IX cases because the "program or activity" under surveillance is
143 104 S.Ct. at 1223 (citation omitted).
'4 FCC v. League of Women Voters of California, 104 S.Ct. 3106, 3128 (1984). See
Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
145 105 S.Ct. at 3237, quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619.
146 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 620.
147 Aguilar, 105 S.Ct. at 3237.
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broader. That is only true, however, because the Court is uniquely
willing in religion cases to assume that improper effects will occur
outside the boundaries of the grant program. A more realistic view
of effects would resolve at one stroke the entanglement problem as
well. 148
A second difficulty with the analogy is that the First Amendment
right relied on by Grove City College was academic freedom, while
the threat to parochial schools concerns their "freedom of religious
belief.' 1 49 It is possible that the Court is more concerned about the
latter right than about the former and is therefore willing to go to
great lengths to protect schools (even against their own wishes)
from "the bewitching power of governmental largesse." 150 The
fear, I suppose, is that parochial schools will have to so change their
practices in order to qualify for aid that they will lose much of their
religious character-and will come to regret this in the end.
That the Court is more solicitous of religious freedom than of
other First Amendment freedoms is a proposition that has some
support. The odd thing is that the cases substantiating it show a
greater willingness to give government money to free exercise
14' That solution to the problem is strongly supported by League of Wvomen Voters, note 145
supra. The Court there held invalid § 399 of the Public Broadcasting Act, 47 U.S.C. § 399
(1982), which forbids broadcasting stations that receive grants from the Corporation for
Public Broadcasting to engage in editorializing. Congress enacted that section because it
feared that recipients would "promulgate [their] own private views on the air at taxpayer
expense" (104 S.Ct. at 3130 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)), just as the Court has adopted
institution-wide effects rules because it fears that recipients will promote religion at taxpayer
expense. League of Women Voters held, however, that an institution-wide prohibition violated
First Amendment freedoms of speech and press:
[A] noncommercial educational station that receives only 1% of its overall income
from CPB grants is barred absolutely from all editorializing .... [Such] a station is
not able to segregate its activities according to the source of its funding. The station
has no way of limiting the use of its Federal funds to all noneditorializing activities,
and, more importantly, it is barred from using even wholly private funds to finance
its editorial activity.
Of course, if Congress were to adopt a revised version of § 399 that permitted
noncommercial educational broadcasting stations to [segregate their activities and]
use the station's facilities to editorialize with non-federal funds, such a statutory
mechanism would plainly be valid.
Id. at 3128. In short, the Constitution actually requires a narrower ("program-specific") view
of the effects of government grants where the recipient institution wants to exercise some
kinds of First Amendment freedoms with its own money. Why that view should be limited
to freedoms of speech and press, and not extend to religion, is not clear.
149 105 S.Ct. at 3237.
"' League of Women Voters, 104 S.Ct. at 3122.
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claimants (and to dispense with restrictions) than to those asserting
other freedoms. s1 ' Moreover, this difficulty, like the last one, varies
with the scope of the restrictions that attend government grants. If
the recipient school is required to do no more than refrain from
putting the government's money to religious ends, it is hard to see
how the government has worked any change in the extent of reli-
gious exercise that private initiative would produce in the absence
of government intervention.
IV. CONCLUSION
I have shown that the antiestablishment and antidiscrimina-
tion principles in school aid cases are both ultimately concerned
with preventing the government from causing improper effects by
giving financial assistance to private institutions. The agencies and
courts implementing Title IX have developed elaborate and fairly
consistent rules for determining how and when such effects occur.
Perhaps it should not be surprising that those effects rules work in
nearly the same way when applied to the problem of parochial
school aid. But it is reassuring, in a way, that the Supreme Court-
acting in an ad hoc fashion over a period of nearly 40 years-has
worked out an architecture for the Establishment Clause that
matches up so well, point for point, with a statutory and regulatory
system designed as a coherent whole.
The only anomaly in the two systems is the Court's willingness
to stretch the "program or activity" rule to cover entire institutions
(or at least their educational functions) in primary and secondary
religious school cases. In doing so, the Court credits theories
of causation that it rejects under Title IX, and it does so without
any evidence that they are more plausible in the Establishment
Clause context. Its reasons for adopting those theories is the en-
tanglement rule-itself a collection of hypotheses about causation
that is even less supportable than the "program or activity" theo-
ries. Abandoning those hypotheses would bring the effects rules
into line with Title IX law and would straighten out the major kink
in Establishment Clause law.
151 See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398 (1963); Garvey, Freedom and Equality in the Religion Clauses, 1981 Supreme Court
Review 193.
